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In recent years, the adaptation of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) to application areas requiring mobility increased the security
threats against confidentiality, integrity, and privacy of the information as well as against their connectivity. Since key management
plays an important role in securing both information and connectivity, a proper authentication and key management scheme is
required in mobility enabled applications where the authentication of a node with the network is a critical issue. In this paper, we
present an authentication and key management scheme supporting node mobility in a heterogeneous WSN that consists of several
mobile sensor nodes and a few fixed sensor nodes. We analyze our proposed solution by using the OMNET++ simulator to show
that it requires less memory space and provides better connectivity and network resilience against node capture attacks compared
to some existing schemes. We also propose two levels of secure authentication methods for the mobile sensor nodes for secure
authentication and key establishment.
1. Introduction
The wireless sensor network (WSN) was initially considered
to be used for military applications but the popularity of
WSN, because of its small size, low cost, and being easy to
deploy andmanage, makes it used in a variety of applications.
This opens a door to new research challenges to the research
community. Since sensor nodes are usually deployed in
possibly remote and unattended locations, they are definitely
prone to security attacks. Hence to secure the network
operation and securely gather and forward the information,
security threats and their countermeasures should be consid-
ered at design time in terms of both requirements and imple-
mentation techniques. However, such tasks are not trivial due
to the limited energy, computation, memory, and bandwidth
resources available in sensor nodes. Fundamentally, any
practical WSN security countermeasure must be, on the one
hand, secure enough to satisfy the initial requirements and,
on the other hand, lightweight enough not to interfere with
normal WSN operations.
The design of security algorithms considering the homo-
geneous sensor networks where all nodes have the same
capabilities (memory, radio range, computational power,
battery life, etc.) was the first step to secure sensor networks.
However, some research work has shown, both theoretically
[1–3] and through simulation experiments and test bed
measurements [4], that homogeneous sensor networks have
high communication and computation overheads and high
storage requirements and suffer from severe performance
bottlenecks. Hence, recent research work [5–9] introduced
heterogeneous sensor networks, which consists of a small
number of powerful high-end sensors (H-sensors) and large
number of low-end sensors (L-sensors). To achieve better
performance and scalability, H-sensors have more resources
in terms of energy, computation power, storage capacity, and
transmission power, and so forth compared to L-sensors.
However, both H-Sensors and L-sensors are still highly vul-
nerable in nature and are exposed to several security threats
and particularly prone to physical attacks. Thus, proper
security mechanisms should be applied to protect these
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Volume 2014, Article ID 718286, 11 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/718286
2 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
nodes against specific attacks including Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks, Sybil attacks, compromised node attacks,
node replication attacks, and physical tampering. Physical
attacks become even more troublesome when the nodes are
mobile and the possible intruder canmore easily target them.
Most security features to provide secure communication and
authentication essentially rely on encryption. Nevertheless,
encryption is not possible in such a distributed environment
without adequate key management mechanisms. For this
reason, the adoption of a suitable key management scheme
plays a central role in the definition of a secure WSN.
1.1. Key Ideas of the Proposed Approach. A key manage-
ment scheme for heterogeneous wireless sensor network is
proposed to overcome the scalability issues by providing
almost 100% network connectivity, reducing memory cost
while increasing the network resilience against attacks, and
reducing communication overhead to save the energy and
increase of network lifetime.
Hence, a novel key management scheme for heteroge-
neous sensor networks suitable for scenarios with partial
mobility is presented. The proposed solution relies on two
types of keys: authentication keys and secret communication
codes used to generate secret keys whenever needed.The key
material is assigned to the different nodes of the network
by adopting adequate key predistribution mechanisms. The
remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents existing work. Section 3 describes the proposed
key management scheme, while in Section 4 a performance
analysis and evaluation of the proposed scheme is provided
based on simulations results. Section 5 describes the security
analysis of the proposed scheme, and finally conclusions are
provided in Section 6.
2. Related Work
To make a system secure, cryptography is considered as one
of the important security blockswhich helps in implementing
many security features. However, the management of these
cryptographic keys has always been a challenging task.
To secure wireless sensor networks, Perrig et al. [10]
proposed SPINS, in which there is a secure central entity
called server which is responsible for establishing a key
among the sensor nodes. Before the network deployment,
each node is assigned a secret key while its corresponding
key is assigned to the base station. Each sensor node needs
to authenticate itself to the server (base station) during the
initialization phase using the assigned key. Since it is based
on centralized base station approach, two sensor nodes can
only establish a secret key through its centralized trusted base
station. However, the failure of base station severely affects
the performance of network because of the existence of single
centralized entity (base station).
To overcome the abovementioned issue, a randomly key
distributed approach is proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor
[7]. In this scheme, there is no centralized entity like a
base station for key distribution and management. Each
node in the network is assigned a set of randomly selected
keys from a large key set. Since the keys are distributed
randomly, the two communicating nodes need to have at least
one common key in their sets for secure communication.
However, the nonexistence of a common key in their sets
affects the network connectivity but it improves the network
security against node capturing attacks. To further improve
the network security, sharing of at least 𝑞-keys concept for
establishing a secret key is introduced by Chan et al. [11].
This scheme improves the network security but it further
degrades the network connectivity and increases thememory
requirements. But the prior knowledge of node’s deployment
in the network helps in increasing the network connectiv-
ity and reduces the memory requirements [12] combined
with Rabin’s scheme [13]. The use of Rabin’s scheme makes
the approach computationally expensive. Hence to achieve
better security and network connectivity with less memory
requirements with low computational cost, NPKPS scheme
is proposed by Zhang et al. [14] for wireless sensor networks.
The above described approaches are suitable for the static
networks only. Because introducing node’s mobility needs
to increase the size of assigned key set which increases
the memory requirements. Hence to reduce the memory
cost, a level-based key management scheme for multicast
communication is proposed by Kim and Ramakrishna [15]
while a two-layered dynamic key management for clustered
based wireless sensor networks is presented by Chuang et al.
[16].
The management of secret keys (MASY) protocol is
presented byMaerien et al. in [17] which is based on the trust
assumption among the networks managers/base stations.
When a node enters into an unknown networks, it can
establish a secret key with the new network’s manager/base
station using the trust relationship assumption among the
networks managers/base stations.
To further improve the network connectivity and reduce
the memory requirements of the symmetric key distribu-
tion approaches, Du et al. [9] present an asymmetric key
predistribution (AP) approach. Du sensor network model
consists of two different types of nodes making it heteroge-
neous sensor networks (HSNs).This assumption significantly
increases the network connectivity and reduces memory
requirements compared to the existing symmetric key man-
agement approaches. Nodes with high capabilities act as
cluster head and are assigned 𝑚 keys, while nodes with low
capabilities act as normal nodes and are assigned 𝑙 keys, where
𝑚 ≫ 𝑙. This assumption increases the network resilience
against node capturing attacks. Lu et al. [18] propose a
framework for key management schemes in distributed
peer-to-peer wireless sensor networks with heterogeneous
sensor nodes and show by simulation that heterogeneity
results in higher connectivity and higher resilience. Du et al.
[19] propose a routing-driven key management scheme for
heterogeneous wireless sensor networks, based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC), which provides better security
with significant reduction ofmemory overhead.However, the
prior knowledge of nodes deployment in the network further
improves the network connectivity and resilience by reducing
the memory cost [20].
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Figure 1: Virtual network architecture.
Network Model. The considered network model is a Het-
erogeneous Sensor Network (HSN) composed of H-sensors,
that is, powerful nodes and L-sensors, that is, having limited
capabilities. More specifically, H-sensors and L-sensors have
different computational resources, available storage capacity,
and battery lifetime, but we assume that all nodes use the
same transmission power and have the same transmission
rate. In addition, a Base Station (BS) acts as a reference sink
node in HSNs and as a gateway offering connectivity towards
other types of networks. With respect to mobility, H-sensors
have the role of fixed nodes (FNs) thus defining, along with
the BS, a sort of fixed WSN infrastructure, while L-sensors
are considered as mobile nodes (MNs). The virtual network
organization is shown in Figure 1. From the security point
of view, sensor nodes are allowed to communicate only after
being authenticated by the network and having established a
communication key with the peer node.
In this proposed network architecture, the base station
and the fixed nodes are more powerful than mobile nodes,
hence given the responsibility to play an important role in
the authentication and key management. More specifically,
the fixed nodes act as cluster heads (CHs) while the mobile
nodes act as cluster members. The selection of cluster head
by the mobile node is based on the received signal strength
of fixed nodes. Since the fixed nodes and mobile nodes are
using the same transmission power, a MN may come in the
coverage range of transmission of more than one fixed node.
Hence a mobile node selects a fixed node with the highest
signal strength as its cluster head.
To introduce the mobility in the network, we use a
realistic mobility model in the OMNET++ simulator. The
considered mobility model for the proposed scheme is the
random way-point model [21]. This model ensures that all
the targeted destinations are equiprobable. Each node in the
network is given (1) its initial deployed location, (2) target
location, (3) velocity, and (4) time duration for taking a
random decision. Once the timer expires, the node randomly
chooses next location as a target and keeps its velocity
constant and starts its journey toward the new selected target
location in the given area.When it arrives to the new location,
it repeats the process again. However, the selection of a
target location in a given scenario is based on a uniform
distribution.
Here we describe a list of abbreviations used in the
proposed solution:
CH: cluster head,
MN: mobile node,
FN: fixed node,
KPmain: main large key pool,
KPFN: subkey pool for fixed nodes,
KPMN: subkey pool for mobile nodes,
Kplc: public key,
Kprt: private key,
prand(): prime number generator,
AUTH: authentication code,
4 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
PRM: generated prime number,
SPMN: scalar product of a mobile node,
SPFN: scalar product of a fixed node,
SCC: secret communication code.
3. Proposed Scheme
The proposed key management scheme is built on top of the
above network model to provide effective authentication and
dynamic key establishment. The key material is generated at
the BS.More specifically, a large key pool KPmail is created and
then divided into two subkey pools KPFN andKPMN such that
KPFN ∩ KPFN = 0.
The key pool KPFN is used by the FNs of the network
while the key pool KPMN is used by the MNs of the
network for the secret key establishment. For authentication
purposes, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is used during
the initialization phase for key generation. Three different
phases have been taken into account:
(1) key predistribution to the different sensor nodes, that
is, FNs and MNs;
(2) node authentication;
(3) communication key establishment among the nodes
within the network.
Further details will be provided in the following subsections.
Furthermore, Figure 2 presents a graphical description of all
the operations foreseen in the proposed solution.
3.1. Key Predistribution. As already mentioned, in our pro-
posed scheme, the key material is organized at the BS in a
large key pool KPmain which is then randomly divided into
key pool KPFN and into key pool KPMN such that KPFN ∩
KPMN = 0. Now each FN 𝑖 is assigned a randomly selected
key pool KPFN𝑖 from the key pool KPFN where KPFN𝑖 ≪ KPFN
and contains |KPFN𝑖 | keys while each MN 𝑗 is assigned a
randomly selected key pool KPMN𝑗 from the key pool KPMN
where KPMN𝑗 ≪ KPMN and contains |KPMN𝑗 | keys. Since
these two key pools are disjoint, KPFN𝑖 ∩ KPMN𝑗 = 0. These
assigned key pools will be used by the FNs and by the MNs
for the establishment of a secret communication key using the
assigned key generation algorithm.
Concerning the authentication keymaterial, each FN and
each MN are assigned an elliptic curve 𝐸(𝑎, 𝑏) over a finite
Galois field 𝐹(𝐺) and a base point 𝐺 along with a unique
authentication code AUTH. Each FN and each MN are also
assigned an ECC-based public/private key pair (Kplc,Kprt)
and a prime number generator (prand()).
As previously described, FNs and the BS compose the
fixed infrastructure of the overall heterogeneous sensor
network; they are powerful devices and are responsible for
the authentication and key management services offered
to the MNs. In order to maintain the availability of these
services and to avoid the full network being compromised by
attackers, a higher level of security is thus required for FNs
and the BS. As a consequence, the authentication of FNs to
the network and the communication between the FNs and
between a FN and the BS will be based on a standard ECC-
based private/public key mechanism. Accordingly, each FN
has its own private key and the public key of the BS and of all
the other FNs of the network. At the same time, the BS has
the public keys of all the FNs.
All the previously introduced key material is transferred
to each node of the network by means of secure side
channels. Then, after this predistribution phase, the specific
key material assigned to each type of node of the network is
as follows:
(i) the BS owns all the key material that needs to be
predistributed (plus, as already described, the public
key of each FN);
(ii) each FN 𝑖 has been given 𝐸(𝑎, 𝑏), 𝐺, and AUTH
𝑖
for authentication purposes and key pool KPFN𝑖 for
communication key establishment;
(iii) each MN 𝑗 has been given 𝐸(𝑎, 𝑏), 𝐺, and AUTH
𝑗
for
authentication purposes and KPMN𝑗 for communica-
tion key establishment.
3.2. Node Authentication. After the deployment and key
predistribution phase, each FN of the network broadcasts
periodic Hello messages. This mechanism enables each FN
to fill a table with all neighboringMNs.These Hello messages
include the FN ID and a random nonce signed by the FN’s
private key. Upon the reception of those Hellomessages, each
MN selects a FN as its cluster head (CH), for example, the one
with the highest signal strength, after the verification of Hello
message by using the FN public key. Since Hello message
verification is a part of the authentication phase, at this point
the authentication phase among the FNs and the MNs can
start. To this aim, each MN
𝑗
authenticates the Hello message
of the selected FN
𝑖
as a CH as follows. First MN
𝑗
uses the FN
𝑖
ID and generates a prime number PRMFN𝑖 using the prime
number generator prand()
PRMFN𝑗 = prand (IDFN𝑖) . (1)
After the generation of PRMFN𝑖 , theMN𝑗 generates the public
key of the FN
𝑖
using the scalar multiplication as
Kplc = (PRMFN𝑖 + IDFN𝑖) ⋅ 𝐺. (2)
Then the MN
𝑗
can verify the Hello message signature.
Successful verification of theHellomessage signature authen-
ticates the CH, that is, FN
𝑖
to the MN
𝑗
. The MN then
calculates the scalar product of the assigned authentication
code AUTH
𝑗
and its private key Kprt as
SPMN𝑗 = (AUTH𝑗 + IDMN𝑗) ⋅ Kprt. (3)
Then theMN
𝑗
sends a joining request including its ID, SPMN𝑗 ,
and the nonce it had received from the CHback to its selected
CH, all signed by its private key. After receiving the MN
𝑗
’s
joining request message, the FN
𝑖
first authenticates MN
𝑗
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Figure 2: Overview of the proposed key management scheme.
before registering it as a trusted cluster member. The FN
𝑖
follows the same procedure as the MN
𝑗
did to check the
authenticity of the received messages. First the FN
𝑖
uses the
MN
𝑗
ID and generates a prime number PRMMN𝑗 using the
prime number generator prand()
PRMMN𝑗 = prand (IDMN𝑗) . (4)
After the generation of PRMMN𝑗 , the FN𝑖 generates the public
key of the MN
𝑗
using scalar multiplication as
Kplc = (PRMMN𝑗 + IDMN𝑗) ⋅ 𝐺. (5)
After the generation of the MN
𝑗
public key, the FN
𝑖
verifies
the joining message signature. Successful verification and
reception of the correct nonce ensure that the MN
𝑗
is
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an authentic mobile node belonging to the network. The CH
registers this MN
𝑗
into its authentic MN member list and
calculates the scalar product of AUTH
𝑖
and its private key as
SPFN𝑖 = (AUTH𝑖 + IDFN𝑖) ⋅ Kprt. (6)
Finally the CH generates an authentication certificate for this
MN using SPMN𝑗 and SPFN𝑖 as
Authentication Certificate = SPMN𝑗 ⋅ SPFN𝑖 mod 𝐺. (7)
TheCHsends SPFN𝑖 to theMN𝑗which is used in the secret key
generation and for the authentication certificate generation.
3.3. Communication Key Establishment. Once the MN and
CH/FN authenticate each other successfully, the key estab-
lishment phase starts. During this phase, the MN sends one
of its secret communication codes SCC
1
, randomly selected
from KPMN and encrypted by the CH public key to its CH as
described above.TheCHalso selects randomly another secret
communication code SCC
2
from its pool KPFN and sends it to
the correspondingMN. After the reception of this secret code
by theMN, theMN and the FN both have the same SCC
1
and
SCC
2
. Now the MN and the FN use SCC
1
, SCC
2
, SPMN𝑗 and
SPFN𝑖 to generate secret key using standard approach defined
in [22] as
Secret Key = SCC
1
⋅ SCC
2
mod (SPMN𝑗 ⋅ SPFN𝑖) . (8)
Once a secret key is established between the CH and each
MN, the CH has assigned a Shared Secret Code (SSC) to its
all member MNs. This shared secret code is updated both
periodically and when a MN compromission is detected.
Since the MNs move in the network to perform their duties,
they may need to establish a secure communication link also
with neighboring MNs, possibly very frequently due to their
movement within the network. In order to keep track of their
neighboring MNs, each MN broadcasts a short range Hello
message to know about its neighboring MNs. To establish a
secret key with a neighboring MN, both MNs will share their
secret communication code IDs assigned to them as KPMN.
Now both theMNs will find the maximum number of shared
codes with one another and will generate a secret key using
all of them as
Secret Key =
𝑓
∏
𝑙=1
SCC
1𝑙
mod SSC, (9)
where “𝑓” represents the total number of common secret
communication codes. Since the distributions of the SCC
1
codes to the MNs is random and probabilistic, two neighbor-
ing MNs might not have any secret communication code in
common. In this case, to avoid any discontinuity, the MNs
will use the assigned Shared Secret Code (SSC) from their
common CH and their IDs to establish a secret key with its
neighboring MNs. For example, if MN
𝑚
wants to establish
a secret key with MN
𝑛
but these two nodes do not have
any common secret communication code (SCC), then they
establish a secret key by first calculating and sharing 𝐿 and𝐾
with each other as
𝐿 = prand (IDMN𝑛) ⋅ SPMN𝑚 ⋅ AUTH𝑚 ⋅ SSCmod𝐺, (10)
𝐾 = prand (IDMN𝑚) ⋅ SPMN𝑛 ⋅ AUTH𝑛 ⋅ SSCmod𝐺, (11)
Secret key = 𝐿 ⋅ 𝐾 mod SSC. (12)
3.4. Handover. TheMNs aremoving and theymay leave their
current CH and join a new CH. In order to know when they
need to perform the handover to remain connected to the
network, each MN monitors (e.g., by sending periodically a
signal strength inquiry message) the SNR of its CH. Once
the MN detects that its CH SNR is below a predefined
threshold value, it broadcasts a request to find its neighboring
FNs. Upon the reception of the response, the MN selects
the FN with the highest SNR as its new CH. When the
MN performs the transition from its old CH to the new
CH, it sends its old CH identity, SPMN𝑗 , and authentication
certificate to the new CH and a cluster leaving message to
the old CH. The new CH communicates directly with the
old CH of the MN, using its public key, to confirm the
MNs transition and for the verification of the authentication
certificate. Once the new CH receives the MNs transition
confirmation and the authentication certificate verification, it
adds this incoming MN to its trusted member MN list. Also
the new CH generates its own SPFN𝑖 and sends it to the MN
to update the certificate.
3.5. Protection of Key Material. Since the sensor network
may be deployed in unattended or even hostile areas, for
example, when used for military applications, node capture
and physical damage cannot be avoided. In order to protect
the key material, we assume that each node is provided
with tamper resistant hardware [23] and with a mechanism
operating in such a way that when a node is captured
and physically damaged, its keys become invalid. More
specifically, once a manumission attempt is detected, both
the original authentication and communication keys and the
relevant IDs are replaced by fake ones: this would ensure that
the original keys material is never revealed to an adversary.
Once the FN receives a joining request and key request
from a compromised MN, it will inform the BS and all its
neighboring FNs about the compromised MN’s ID so that
each FN can delete the key map of this compromised MN.
In case the FN itself is compromised, however, it would
not be able to generate the secret key and when it tries
to authenticate the MN, the MN will understand that the
FN is compromised. The MN would then contact other
neighboring FNs for authentication and communication key
establishment and eventually notify them about the compro-
mised FN.This information will be also propagated to the BS
for verification. The BS will then ask the compromised FN
about its communication key IDs. If the BS receives thewrong
key IDs, then the BS would declare this FN as compromised
and inform all the other FNs of the network about it.
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4. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the results obtained by using
OMNET++ simulators. In order to introduce the mobility
in OMNET++ simulation, we use MixiM 2.0.1 framework.
Simulations are based on a network with 400 mobile nodes
(MNs) and 16 fixed nodes (FNs). The area where the MNs
are deployed and move is 400m × 400m. As mentioned
earlier, we are using the same transmission power for both the
fixed nodes and the mobile nodes, using the CSMA 802.15.4
standard and the radio specifications based on the CC2420
radio chip. The velocity of the mobile nodes is kept constant
at 1m/s while the next target’s location selection interval is
set to 0.1 s. The transmission power is set to 10mW and the
receiver sensitivity is set to −95 dBm.
4.1. Connectivity. Network connectivity is considered an ess-
ential part in evaluating the performance of the network.
From the security point of view, two neighboring nodes in
a network are said to be connected if they have a secret key for
secure communication. In this section, we are evaluating the
performance of the proposed scheme against some existing
schemes in terms of probability that two nodes can authenti-
cate each other and establish a secret key (i.e., connectivity).
In the scheme discussed above, we use both (1) online key
generation for authentication and (2) secret communication
key establishment and key predistribution to ensure one-hop
network connectivity among the MNs.
Here the network connectivity is evaluated by using the
OMNET++ simulation results. In case of the key predistribu-
tion techniques, the probability of single key sharing defines
the network connectivity and is given by
Pr [Match] =
(
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPmain
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 −
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPMN
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨)! (
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPmain
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 −
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPFN
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨)!
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPmain
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨! (
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPmain
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 −
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPMN
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 −
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPFN
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨)!
,
(13)
where KPmain is a large key set containing |KPmain| keys from
which a key set KPMN containing |KPMN| keys is assigned
to each mobile node and a key set KPFN containing |KPFN|
keys is assigned to each fixed node, where |KPFN| ≫ |KPMN|.
In balanced key distribution schemes where each node of a
homogeneous sensor networks is assigned the same number
of keys, that is, KPMN = KPFN = KPnode, and the single key
sharing probability is given by
Pr [Match] =
(
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPmain
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 −
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPnode
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨) !
2
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPmain
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨! (
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPmain
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 − 2
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPnode
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨)!
. (14)
Figure 3 represents the OMNET++ simulation results
comparing the connectivity of a MN to the CH with some
of the existing schemes [7, 9, 14, 24]. It is clear that the
online authentication key generation technique substantially
improves the network connectivity because the network
connectivity provided by the proposed scheme is almost
100%.
In order to further analyze the effect of key pool size on
network connectivity in the key predistribution schemes, we
carried out OMNET++ simulation to find the key sharing
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Figure 3: Single authentication key sharing probability between
fixed node and mobile node.
probability between the FNs and MNs by limiting the MN
key pool sizes (|KPMN|) to 10, 20, and 30 and the FN key pool
sizes (|KPFN|) to 450, 550, and 650 from a large key pool of
size |KPmain| = 10, 000. A simulation of 10,000 seconds for
each combination of FN and MN key pool size is performed.
For each we evaluate how many key requests were received
fromMNs by FNs and for howmany key requests the FN has
a shared key. If the total number of key requests received by all
the FNs is 𝑋 and the total number of key requests for which
FNs have a share key is 𝑌, the key sharing probability is given
by
Pr [Match]Simulation =
𝑋
𝑌
. (15)
Figure 4 represents the comparison of the effects of assigning
different key pools to the MNs and FNs in terms of network
connectivity obtained from OMNET++. The results show
that the connectivity increases by assigning large key pools to
the FNs and to the MNs in the existing key predistribution
schemes while the proposed scheme is independent of the
assigned key pool sizes and provides almost 100% network
connectivity as shown in Figure 3.
The deployment of the fixed nodes is such that it covers
the whole area of the network. Under this assumption, a
mobile node may come into the coverage area of more than
one fixed node; hence the probability of authentication of
each MN by any in-range authentic FN is given by
Pr [Authentication] = 1 − (1 − Pr [Match])𝑑 , (16)
where 𝑑 represents the total number of neighboring fixed
nodes, Pr[Authentication] is the probability of authentica-
tion, and Pr[Match] is single key sharing probability defined
by (11). Figure 5 shows that the coverage of eachMN by more
than one FN dramatically increases the authentication prob-
ability of the MN, which in turn improves the connectivity
8 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
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KPMN = 30.
of the MN to the network. However, it is still less than what
is achieved by the proposed algorithm. This is because the
selection of the FN depends on the link quality, availability,
and bandwidth but the common key matching also plays an
important role in case of key predistribution schemes, while it
is not necessary in the proposed scheme. Figure 5 shows the
OMNET++ result when the MN is within the range of one
FN. So far, we assumed that each MN is at least under the
radio coverage of one FN, but in a real network deployment,
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Figure 6: Single key sharing probability among the mobile nodes.
this may not be always possible. In that case, a MN may
communicate with the FN through another intermediate
MN. For that, aMNmust share at least one common key with
the other MNs in case of the key predistribution schemes,
which further affects the performance of the network in
terms of connectivity. The probability of sharing at least one
common key between the MNs can be obtained analytically
using (12). Figure 6 shows the results obtained by using
OMNET++ simulator.
4.2. Memory Cost. The secret communication code key pool
KPmain is divided into two subkey pools KPFN for the FNs
and KPMN for the MNs such that KPFN ∩ KPMN = 0. Each
individual key SCC
1
of KPFN can be used to create a secret
key with all the keys of KPMN and vice versa. Thus the total
possible number of secret keys is
Total secret keys = 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPFN
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 ∗
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPMN
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 . (17)
Let us assume that |KPFN| = |KPMN| = 30 keys. The total
possible number of secret keys generated by these two key
pools is 900. If we compare our proposed scheme with the
existing schemes proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor in [7],
instead of storing 900 keys in a sensor node, only 30 keys are
required in each FN and in eachMN to get 900 possible secret
key combinations. This reduces the memory cost of the node
whilemaintaining the same level of security by assigning only
30 keys instead of assigning 900 keys.
4.3. Node Energy Consumption. In this section, the energy
consumption in the authentication and in key establishment
phases has been observed using OMNET++ by optimizing
the proposed algorithm in terms of the total number of
exchanged message. Figure 2 shows that we need only two
messages in the proposed scheme for the authentication pur-
pose compared to [25–27] which require 4, 3, and 3messages,
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respectively. Hence it is clear that less messages exchange
consumes less energy in the proposed scheme. Again the total
number of messages required in key establishment phase has
been reduced to only two messages in the proposed scheme
which is less than the existing approaches [25–27]. Hence the
overall message exchanges by each node in the authentication
phase and in the key establishment phase, including the
acknowledgement, of the proposed algorithm are 5 while in
the other schemes [25–27] they are 6, 7, and 6, respectively.
Figure 7 shows the comparison of the overall energy con-
sumption of a node in the proposed algorithm with [25–27].
It is clear from the results that the proposed scheme consumes
less energy than other algorithms. Hence it increases the
network life time.
5. Security Evaluation
5.1. Denial of Service Attack. In this section we describe some
kind of Denial of Service attacks (DoS attacks) that can be
brought against our proposed scheme, as well as possible
countermeasures. The main objective of DoS attacks is to
make the resources unavailable to an intended user of the
network.
(1) FNHelloMessages.Thefirst possibleDoS attack against the
proposed scheme is to broadcast Hello messages pretending
to be a FN of the network to exhaust the resources of the
MNs. Since each Hello message is signed by the private key
of the FN, MNs will verify it using the public key of that FN.
Since the adversary FN is not an authentic node, the MN
would not be able to verify that Hello message and once a
MN detects this attack, it will inform its other neighboring
authentic FNs. The authentic FNs would then inform the BS
and neighboring MNs about this fake FN ID so that they can
avoid the messages from that node.
(2) MN Hello Messages. When a MN finds its current
CH signal strength value below a threshold value, it starts
broadcasting the MN Hello messages to know about its new
neighboring FNs. The attacker can launch such MN Hello
message broadcast attack by introducing a fake MN. Since
the MN Hello broadcast message is also signed by the MN
private key, the new FNs first verify it by using theMN public
key. This would not be possible for a fake MN. Thus the
FNs inform the BS and other neighboring FNs about this
malicious MN.
5.2. Sybil Attack. Sybil attacks are those in which a malicious
node illegitimately takes on multiple identities. We call the
nodes performing these attacks as Sybil nodes. Sybil attacks
can be of different forms, for example, using direct or
indirect communication and fabricated or stolen identities.
In the direct communication Sybil attacks, a Sybil node
communicates directly with a legitimate node. But since, in
the proposed scheme, the Sybil node is first authenticated by
sending a message signed with its private key, the FN would
not be able to authenticate it. In the indirect communication
Sybil attacks, malicious node (who deploys Sybil nodes in the
network) becomes a router for forwarding the communica-
tion to the Sybil node from the FN which is not possible in
the proposed scheme because each MN is the end user of the
network. In the fabricated Sybil attacks, the attacker assigns
an unuse identity to the Sybil node. In this case, this Sybil
node needs to authenticate itself to the FNs which would
again not be possible in the proposed scheme as described
above. Stolen identity based Sybil attacks are very dangerous
in such resource constrained networks. But this type of Sybil
attack does not affect the proposed scheme because each
communication is encryptedwith the key agreed alreadywith
the original node having this ID, and the Sybil node does not
have these keys.
However, we compare the proposed scheme with the
balanced key predistribution scheme [7] and an unbalanced
key predistribution scheme [9] to show the effectiveness of
proposed scheme. Although the proposed scheme is partially
based on key predistribution approach by assigning |KPFN|
to the FNs and |KPMN| to the MNs but in the proposed
scheme |KPFN| ∩ |KPFN| = 0 while in [7, 9], it should be
|KPFN| ∩ |KPFN| ̸= 0.
In the key predistribution approach, if every MN is
assigned |KPMN| keys and every FN is assigned |KPFN| keys
from a key pool of size |KPmain| and an attacker compromises
“𝑐” nodes to create a compromised key pool of size “𝑛”, then
the probability of a Sybil node to be successfully created is
Prsybil node =
KPMN
∑
𝑡=1
(
𝑛
𝑡 ) (
KPmain−𝑛
KPMN−𝑡 )
(
KPmain
KPMN )
(
KPmain−KPMN+𝑡
KPMN )
(
KPmain
KPMN )
. (18)
Figure 8 shows the probability of successfully generated
Sybil nodes in the proposed scheme compared with scheme
[7, 9].
5.3. Node Compromission. As described in Section 3.5, we
assume that a node is secured by hardware means against
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Figure 9: Network resilience against compromised mobile nodes.
access to its keys. However, no such scheme is ever perfect;
hence here we analyze the effects of such attacks on our key
management scheme.
In existing key predistribution schemes for both homo-
geneous and heterogeneous sensor networks, each node is
assigned a key pool, and for secure communication the two
nodes must have a shared common key. In that case, once
the node is compromised by an adversary, it can compromise
all the secure links with neighbors with whom this node
has a shared key. Thus the fraction of communications
compromised by compromising 𝑐MNs is given by
𝑃 [Compromised] = 1 − (1 −
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
KPMN𝑗
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨KPMN
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
)
𝑐
, (19)
where |KPMN𝑗 | is the number of keys stored in the MN and
|KPMN| is the size of the authentication key pool from which
KPMN𝑗 is randomly selected for each MN. Figure 9 shows
the OMNET++ simulation results of the effect of this kind
of attack on our proposed scheme compared with the key
predistribution scheme in [7, 9, 14, 24]. The graph shows that
our scheme provides almost 100% resilience against this kind
of attack.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new authentication and key
management scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks
including mobile nodes. The relevant network and mobility
models have been presented as well. The proposed key
management scheme is based on two different types of the
key pools, that is, an authentication key pool and a commu-
nication key pool. Based on these pools, a key predistribution
mechanism has been defined. Moreover, we compared our
solution with some of the existing keymanagement protocols
for both homogeneous and heterogeneous sensor networks.
The results showed that the two considered key pools not only
provide better network connectivity in terms of authentica-
tion key sharing in the mobile scenario but also offer better
security, while consuming less memory space compared with
balanced key predistribution protocols. Furthermore, the
proposed solution provides better network resilience against
the node capture attacks compared to the other reference
protocols considered.
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